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Abstract: 
We analyze alternative capacity pricing schemes (access charges) to implement an open-access 
railway system in Tanzania. We show that the implementation of variable access charges widely 
used in the railway industry may result in levels of traffic lower than the traffic operated by an 
integrated railway company. We propose the use of fixed access charges to avoid this problem 
and discuss the main advantages and disadvantages to implement them in the context of multiple 
freight train services in Tanzania.  
1. Rail transportation in Tanzania 
In 2013, Tanzania’s government committed to the implementation of one of the first open-access 
railway systems in the world (Big Results Now, 2013) as a way to ensure adequate level of rail 
service by 1) allowing efficient train operators (TO) to access the infrastructure and operate train 
services, and 2) providing sustainable resources through access charges to maintain the 
infrastructure and keep the system operative in the future. These objectives are critical to prevent 
future railway systems failures such as the 2001 and 2006 Tanzanian railway system concessions 
failures (Olievschi, 2013) that resulted in a major underinvestment in rail transportation in the 
country (Railistics, 2013). This underinvestment critically impacted the operating capacity and 
the reliability of the railway system, essential to improving accessibility to the East African 
landlocked countries: Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Western Democratic Republic of Congo 
(AICD, 2008; Amjadi and Yeats, 1995; Arvis et al., 2010; Raballand and Macchi, 2009). 
However, open-access rail also requires new railway regulations that clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of railway institutions and define a capacity pricing scheme (Railistics, 2013; 
World Bank, 2014). This research analyzes how alternative open-access capacity pricing 
schemes for freight TOs would affect the system level of service and the revenues collected to 
maintain the infrastructure and recover capital costs in the context of the Central Corridor in 
Tanzania. Tanzania’s railway system provides a useful case to illustrate multiple important 
concepts to be considered when implementing a pricing scheme in more complex railway 
systems. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the main types of capacity 
pricing schemes and discusses the financial model used to determine the behavior of TOs under 
each scheme. Section 3 presents the resulting level of service that container and general cargo 
freight TOs would operate under alternative capacity pricing schemes. Section 4 concludes with 
some recommendations for open-access capacity pricing schemes.  
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2. Capacity pricing schemes for open-access railway system 
The implementation of an open-access railway system requires some level of vertical separation 
between the TOs that operate the trains in the system and collect the revenues selling 
transportation services to the final customers and the infrastructure manager (IM) that maintains 
and manages the infrastructure. Vertical separation requires the definition of a capacity pricing 
scheme that determines the access charges that TOs pay to the IM to access and use the 
infrastructure (Gomez-Ibanez, 2003). The IM uses these revenues to cover infrastructure costs. 
The use of the state national budget to cover shortfalls is the last resort. 
The railway literature proposes three cost-based capacity pricing schemes designed to allow the 
IM to recover maximum infrastructure costs: variable access charges, two-part tariffs (variable 
access charges plus a fixed access charge), and fixed access charges (Gibson, 2003). Under 
variable access charges, TOs pay some amount per train operated; the charge is in general a 
function of the type of train, distance, and tonnage. Under fixed access charges, each TO pays an 
annual lump sum to have a license to operate, regardless of the number of trains the TO operates 
during the year.  
The practice and the broad economic literature in the field recommend the use of variable access 
charges based on marginal cost plus mark-ups (DB, 2009; UIC, 2012; World Bank, 2014). 
However, from an engineering standpoint, infrastructure related costs in Tanzania are mostly 
independent of the level of service. In other words, the short-term and long-term infrastructure 
marginal cost are very low and high mark-ups are required to recover infrastructure costs. This 
research analyzes the implications of resulting alternative pricing schemes for the system.  
For this analysis, we compare the behavior of independent TOs with the behavior of an 
integrated railway company (social planner). We assume that both the independent TOs and the 
integrated railway company are rational agents, i.e. they determine the level of service (number 
of services per direction per week) by maximizing the annual operating margin (operating 
profits). An independent TO would only be interested in operating trains if the average annual 
net cash flow is positive after remunerating any invested capital at an adequate rate of return (no 
operation subsidies).  
We use a financial model developed following (PPIAF et al., 2011) to determine the integrated 
railway company, independent TO, and IM’s operating margin and cash flow for a representative 
year under different levels of service (see World Bank, 2014 for detailed assumptions). The 
integrated railway company faces capital costs associated with the investments in railway 
infrastructure, variable costs of operating trains (train lease, personnel, fuel), and obtains 
revenues from transporting freight. The vertically separated case is similar: the TO faces cost of 
accessing the tracks (access charges), variable costs of operating trains, and obtains revenues 
from transporting freight. The IM faces investment costs in railway infrastructure, maintenance 
costs, and obtains revenues from access charges. 
Investment in railway infrastructure includes $300 million investment required to rehabilitate the 
current Tanzanian railway system (CPCS, 2013; World Bank, 2014) plus periodic investment in 
maintenance. The revenues of the TOs are determined multiplying the cargo transported 
(minimum between the capacity of the trains operated and the demand) by the shipping rate. Due 
to the strong competition from trucks that offer door-to-door transportation services, railway 
companies have an upper limit on the shipping rate they may charge and they have low control 
over the demand that would likely shift to rail. The state should facilitate strong intermodal 
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integration with the port and with truck companies that provide last mile transportation to/from 
the terminal rail station to make rail transportation more attractive and increase the utilization of 
the highly underused railway capacity.  
3. Discussion of the results 
In this section, we discuss the main results obtained for alternative capacity pricing schemes 
designed to recover maintenance and financial infrastructure costs and to ensure that TOs can 
viably operate (positive profits) in Tanzania in two scenarios: 1) considering only container TOs, 
and 2) considering both container and general cargo (non-container freight) TOs.  
3.1. Container traffic 
Figure 1 shows the annual operating margin and the cash flow for an independent container TO, 
for the IM, and for an integrated railway company in Tanzania under variable and fixed access 
charges when no other type of TO operate in the line. Both access charges have been calculated 
to recover as much of the infrastructure costs as possible, while ensuring that the operating 
margin and the net cash flow of the independent TO are positive. Note that it is not possible to 
recover all the infrastructure cost ($22.9 million per year in Tanzania) only with container 
services. The maximum charges that an independent TO could viably pay are $0.035 per ton-km 
(variable) or $19.1 million per year (fixed). We compute these numbers estimating the TO 
maximum revenues, the variable and fixed costs, and therefore the maximum fixed and variable 
access charges that the TO can viably pay to achieve an annual net cash flow equal to zero.  
The results also show that under only variable access charges, a rational independent TO would 
operate only two trains per direction per week while the social planner would operate four. This 
mismatch happens because when the social planner tries to maximize its operating margin, it 
operates a train when the additional revenues produced are higher than the additional variable 
costs (train lease, personnel and fuel). For the social planner, most infrastructure investment cost 
is a sunk cost: it is already made and it is independent of the level of service. Under variable 
access charges in contrast, the infrastructure costs are charged as variable costs for TOs. 
Therefore, a rational TO would only operate a train if the additional revenues produced are 
higher than the true variable costs plus a share of the infrastructure cost that appears now as an 
artificial variable cost (the variable access charge).  
Under fixed access charges, the infrastructure costs are charged as a fixed cost for TOs. 
Therefore, this cost will also be a sunk cost for the TO. Consequently, the TO will operate a train 
when additional revenues produced are higher than the true variable operation costs and there is 
no mismatch with the level of service of the social planner.  
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Figure 1. Operating margin and cash flow for different levels of service with variable and fixed access charges.  
3.2. Container and general cargo traffic 
The previous subsection considers container traffic because container shippers have high 
willingness to pay to ship containers. Nonetheless, there is plenty unused capacity in the 
Tanzanian railway system and there are other types of customers interested in transporting non-
containerized freight (general cargo) along the corridor. We carried out a similar analysis of 
costs and revenues for general cargo services (World Bank, 2014) 0 per ton-kilometer (variable) 
or $10.5 million per year (fixed). In both cases an integrated railway company and an 
independent TO would operate ten services per week.  
Considering these numbers, the IM would need to charge a variable access charge of $0.023 per 
ton-kilometer (variable) or $12.4 million per year (fixed) to the container TO to recover all 
infrastructure costs. Note that if the container TO was charged only $10.5 million per year or 
$0.010 per ton-km it would not be able to recover infrastructure costs (only $21.0 and $15.9 
million per year respectively). This shows, first of all, that discriminate pricing would be needed 
to recover infrastructure costs. Although a general cargo TO cannot viably pay as much as a 
container TO per ton to access the infrastructure, allowing access to the infrastructure to general 
cargo TOs 1) allows the IM to recover infrastructure costs (not possible only with container 
5 
	  
TOs), 2) allows container TOs to pay lower charges to access the infrastructure, and 3) improves 
welfare (for general cargo TOs and general cargo shippers) from a state point of view.  
Although these charges are consistent with the industry benchmark (World Bank, 2014), a 
regulator needs considerable information (operation costs, demand estimates) to determine the 
maximum access charges that each TO is able to pay. Lower charges would not allow the IM to 
recover infrastructure costs; higher charges (particularly for general cargo in this case) would not 
allow TOs to viably operate trains in the system.  
With a variable access charge of $0.023 per ton-kilometer, an independent container TO would 
only operate three (note that the variable charges are now lower than in 3.1.) train services per 
direction per week (instead of the four that a social planner would operate). Under fixed access 
charges, the level of service of independent TOs in equilibrium matches the level of service that 
an integrated railway company would operate. The main challenge to implement fixed access 
charges in this case consists of determining the share of infrastructure costs ($22.9 million per 
year) that each TO should pay. Nonetheless, our computation shows that the level of service 
operated by the TOs is robust when the distribution of fixed access charges change: the container 
and the general cargo TO would be able to pay up to $19.1 million and $10.5 million per year 
respectively while still being profitable. Any choice such that the annual fixed access charge for 
the container TO is lower than or equal to $19.1 million, for the general cargo TO is lower than 
or equal to $10.5 million, and the sum of both charges is $22.9 million would improve level of 
service with respect to variable charges while enabling infrastructure cost recovery. This result 
has important implications: 1) it relaxes the constraint on how much information the regulator 
needs to determine fixed access charges, and 2) it allows the regulator to design the fixed charge 
level for TOs with different objectives: such as ensure equity, ensure efficiency, ensure general 
cargo services. 
Under fixed access charges with no variable charges per train, states could implement different 
schemes to allocate operating licenses among potential TOs. First, the regulator could determine 
a fee (fixed access charge) that a container and a general cargo TO would have to pay to get the 
license to recover infrastructure costs ($22.9 million per year). If the charges allow the operators 
to viably operate, they would apply for the license and retain the additional profits ($19.1 or 
$10.5 million per year minus access charge for each type of TO). Second, when there are several 
companies willing to operate trains, the state could implement an auction to allocate the license 
to operate in each market. If the license is awarded to the TO with higher willingness to pay at 
each market, the most efficient container and general cargo TOs would bid $19.1 and $10.5 
million respectively. In this case, the publicly owned IM would obtain $29.6 million per year 
(instead of $22.9). The IM can either use the additional revenues to invest in infrastructure in the 
future or transfer them to the government. If the license is awarded to the TOs that offer best 
shipping rate to customers provided that the IM can recover infrastructure costs, the IM would 
recover $22.9 million per year, the TOs would recover their costs with some return, and the 
customers would benefit from a discount in their shipping rate of $6.7 million per year ($29.6 
minus $22.9). Further options can be explored when more than one license per market (container 
and general cargo) are allocated. 
4. Conclusions 
In this article, we analyze different capacity pricing schemes designed to recover infrastructure 
costs (periodic maintenance and financial costs) and to ensure that TOs can viably operate 
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(positive net cash flow) in Tanzania. The insights derived from this case are useful to design 
open-access railway systems in other countries.  
First of all, we show that the adoption of variable access charges widely used in the railway 
industry may create incentives for rational TOs to operate fewer trains than an integrated railway 
company (social planner). We show that the use of fixed access charges aligns the behavior of 
vertically separated firms with the behavior of an integrated railway company. This result is 
important in the railway industry because most infrastructure costs are fixed, i.e., for the most 
part they do not vary with the level of service as is generally assumed.  
The results obtained also show that: 1) discriminate pricing may be needed to be able to recover 
infrastructure costs when different types of TOs face very different levels of cost and revenues, 
2) regulators need considerable information about the sector (demand and cost) to determine 
adequate access charge levels that TOs can viably pay, 3) the level of service offered by TOs is 
robust for a wide range of fixed access fees, relaxing the regulator needs of information, 4) 
different levels of fixed access charges can be designed with different objectives, and 5) the state 
choice of different capacity pricing schemes has implications on the welfare distribution among 
stakeholders.  
Future work should analyze further how to implement fixed access charges effectively, 
especially in cases with competing TOs in the same market to avoid barriers to entry. Future 
research should also determine how these conclusions change with demand uncertainty, elasticity 
in the demand, and imperfect information, in instances in which infrastructure capacity is limited 
or there are important network effects in the system, and in instances in which the capacity of the 
regulator is limited.  
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